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Abstract
The literature has shown that an increase in housing wealth, driven by unexpected shocks
to house prices, exerts a positive e¤ect on the birthrates of homeowners. According to
canonical models, a decrease in housing wealth has a symmetric negative impact on the
fertility behavior of households. That is, housing gains and losses of the same size should
have identical quantitative e¤ects on fertility. In comparison, prospect theory suggests that
people care more about housing losses than equivalent gains, leading to an asymmetric
e¤ect of housing wealth on the fertility decision. In our model, we weight the utility from
childbirth by the utility from the price of housing, where the reference level is the house
price in previous years. The theoretical model suggests that the probability of childbirth is
kinked at a reference level of housing wealth and the wealth e¤ects are discontinuously larger
below this kink than above it. We test this theoretical prediction using longitudinal data
on Japanese households. Consistent with this theoretical prediction, our empirical results
show that the fertility responses of homeowners, as measured by the birth hazard rate, are
substantially larger when housing wealth is below its reference level than when it is above
its reference level.
Key words: childbirth; housing price; wealth; homeownership; reference-dependent
preferences; loss aversion
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1 Introduction
Owner-occupied housing is the most signicant form of wealth holding for both young and
middle-aged households in Japan.1 Using microdata from the Nikkei Radar (198799), which
covers households in the Tokyo metropolitan area, Iwaisako (2009) demonstrated that housing
wealth accounts for approximately 90 percent of the total wealth of homeowners in their 20s, and
approximately 80 percent of those in their 30s and 40s. Nonetheless, housing wealth uctuates
markedly because of variations in house prices. Figure 1 depicts the Japan Real Estate Institute
(JREI) Home Price Index, which is based on the price changes for repeat sales of second-hand
condominium properties in the Tokyo metropolitan area.2 As shown, after a signicant decline
in the early 2000s, house values reversed the downward trend in 2005 and reached a peak
in October 2007. Housing prices then fell sharply in 2008 and 2009, possibly because of the
subprime mortgage crisis. While house values recovered somewhat in 2010, they fell again in
2011.
A voluminous literature has investigated how house price uctuations a¤ect household con-
sumption decisions. In a pioneering study, Case et al. (2005) argued that the housing wealth
e¤ect on consumption has become increasingly important, as institutional innovations have made
it simpler to extract cash from housing equity. They hypothesized, and were duly supported
by empirical results, that exogenous changes in house prices are associated with changes in
the available housing equity, thereby changing consumption. More recently, Lovenheim and
Mumford (2013) and Dettling and Kearney (2014) have applied the housing wealth e¤ect to
the childbearing choices of households.Using the same logic, they hypothesized that changes in
home value imply changes in wealth for current homeowners, and that these changes could con-
sequently a¤ect child bearing decisions.Their empirical results indeed suggested that children
are normal goods and that an increase in house prices tended to encourage child bearing among
homeowners.
In general, household fertility decisions are an important issue in Japan because the total
1According to the 2008 Housing and Land Survey, the homeownership rate of Japanese aged 2529 years was
11.5 percent, while that of those in their 30s and 40s was 38.8 percent and 62.2 percent, respectively.
2The JREI Home Price Indices are available at http://www.reinet.or.jp/en/ (accessed June 12, 2015).
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fertility rate was at its lowest level of just 1.26 in 2005. Since then, the total fertility rate has
risen slightly, down 0.01 percentage points from the previous year to 1.42 in 2014. A recent
article has sounded the alarm that the total fertility rate is headed for a long-term decline
as second-generation baby boomers, born between 1971 and 1974, pass their peak childbearing
years.3 Examining the purported link between changes in housing wealth and household fertility
decisions could then inform this issue. However, unlike Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) and
Dettling and Kearney (2014), we shed light on an asymmetry in the response to unanticipated
housing wealth gains and losses. If we consider the housing wealth e¤ect on childbirth only
through the budget constraint, as in Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) and Dettling and Kearney
(2014), we cannot derive this asymmetric e¤ect. We thus examine the impact through a di¤erent
channel by applying prospect theory as developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). This
theory suggests that households care more about wealth losses than equivalent gains through
the value function. In fact, the empirical results in Genesove and Mayer (2001) demonstrated
that homeowners with a potential loss behave di¤erently when compared with those with an
equivalent-sized prospective gain. In our model, the utility from childbirth is weighted by the
utility from the change in house prices, where the reference level is based on the house price in
previous years. The theoretical model then suggests that the probability of childbirth is kinked
at a reference level of housing wealth and that the wealth e¤ects are then discontinuously larger
below the kink than above it.
We test this theoretical prediction using longitudinal data on Japanese households collected
by Keio University. The Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS) is a nationally representative,
large-scale survey that commenced in 2004 with an initial sample of approximately 4,000 house-
holds. We use eight waves of the KHPS from 2004 to 2011. As shown in Figure 1, this period
appears to be ideal for examining the supposed asymmetric housing wealth e¤ect because the
housing market has experienced both price increases and price decreases. These variations in
housing wealth are captured by the relative change in self-reported home values, where self-
reported home values in previous years serves as the reference level. We measure childbearing
3Bracing for demographic change: Japans fertility rate headed for long-term decline. Nikkei Asian Re-
view, June 6, 2015. http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Economy/Japan-s-fertility-rate-headed-for-long-
term-decline (accessed June 12, 2015).
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choices using the birth hazard rate and estimate proportional hazard models to understand the
relationship between changes in housing wealth and family formation behavior. Our empirical
results suggest that, consistent with our theoretical prediction, the fertility responses of home-
owners are substantially larger when housing wealth is below its reference level than above.
Using our empirical results, we then simulate the e¤ect of a one million yen change in house
values on the hazard rate. Our estimates indicate that a one million yen decrease in house values
decreases the hazard rate of childbirth by approximately 10.9 percent, whereas a one million
yen increase in house values leads to an increase in the childbirth hazard rate by a mere 1.0
percent. This suggests that encouraging childbirth through boosting housing markets will entail
a di¤erent magnitude of impact, depending on housing price gains and losses.
2 Literature review
2.1 The e¤ect of housing wealth on consumption
Case et al. (2005) used two panels of cross-sectional time series data: one for developed countries
measuring aggregate consumption and aggregate housing wealth; and the other for US states
measuring aggregate retail sales as a proxy variable for aggregate consumption and the aggregate
value of owner-occupied housing. Although the impact was rather small, the empirical results
demonstrated that changes in housing prices have a signicantly positive impact on household
consumption in the US and other developed countries. Subsequently, Case et al. (2013) extended
the panel of US states used in their earlier study, by incorporating substantial periods of declines
in housing prices. As a result, they identied the statistically signicant and rather large e¤ect
of housing wealth on consumption spending. Campbell and Cocco (2007) used household-level
data from the UK family expenditure survey to estimate the response of consumption to house
prices. Their benchmark model suggested that the elasticity of consumption to house prices is
indeed elastic. Paiella (2009) provides a detailed review of this literature.
Elsewhere, Genesove and Mayer (2001) applied the prospect theory developed by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991) to the housing market. After introducing
their analysis with an account of several sellers who were reluctant to realize a loss on their
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houses, they hypothesized that a seller with a potential loss would be expected to set a higher
price and face a lower hazard rate of sale than a seller with an equivalent-sized prospective gain.
Indeed, their empirical results, using data from the Boston condominium market, indicated
that sellers behave as predicted by the prospect theory. Motivated by this analysis, Case et
al. (2013) hypothesized that the painful regrets associated with decreases in home values exert
stronger psychological consequences than does the pleasant elation associated with increases in
home values, such that homeowners behave asymmetrically as to the gains and losses in housing
wealth. The empirical results suggested that an increase in housing wealth has a positive e¤ect
on household consumption, while a decline in housing wealth has a negative and somewhat larger
e¤ect on consumption, both being consistent with the prospect theory.
Using household-level panel data from the US, Engelhardt (1996) also suggested that sav-
ings display signicant asymmetry in response to unanticipated gains and losses from housing.
That is, homeowners experiencing a housing capital gain do not alter savings behavior, while
those experiencing a loss tend to increase savings. Likewise, Disney et al. (2010), using UK
household panel data along with county-level house price data, demonstrated that households
experiencing an unanticipated loss exhibit a larger reaction in savings than those experiencing
an unanticipated gain. However, these di¤erences were found to be not statistically signicant.
2.2 The e¤ect of housing wealth on childbirth
Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) and Dettling and Kearney (2014) argued that house price
movements are appropriate for examining how increases in individual income a¤ect fertility
because changes in house prices do not a¤ect the cost of parental time to raise children in the
same way that changes in market wages do. An increase in the market wage implies an increase
in the value of time spent on labor; thus, the substitution e¤ect reduces fertility (Becker 1965).
An increase in housing prices also involves a negative substitution e¤ect on the demand for
children, especially for prospective homeowners who would purchase a house with the addition
of a child, when the association between children and housing is a complement. However, as
discussed, rising home values imply a boost in wealth for current homeowners. Consequently,
they could a¤ord to have a child when children are considered normal goods (the wealth e¤ect).
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Even though homeowners do not intend to resell their housing, they can use the increase in
equity to fund their childbearing goals (the equity extraction e¤ect).
Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) also noted that house price movements are valid because
they can be used to generate exogenous shocks to household wealth, which overcomes the endo-
geneity between wealth accumulation and childbirth decisions. Using US individual-level data
(19852007), they estimated linear probability models for families giving birth in a given year
as a function of two- and four-year changes in self-reported home values. The empirical results
demonstrated that a $100,000 increase in an individuals real housing wealth among homeowners
was associated with a 16.4 percent increase in the probability of having a child. By comparison,
among renters, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)-level housing price growth had no signi-
cant e¤ect on current fertility. Because the positive e¤ect of home price changes on childbirth
is only observed for homeowners, these tend to capture the hypothesized wealth e¤ect.
Although Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) considered that house price movements are exoge-
nous, potential endogeneity issues remain. For example, households that plan to have children
may purchase homes in good neighborhoods, therefore self-selecting into locations that are more
likely to experience high housing price growth in the future. Such selection mechanisms bias
upwards conventional estimates of the e¤ect of house price growth on fertility. To address this
possibility, Dettling and Kearney (2014) used MSA-level housing supply elasticity as an in-
strumental variable (IV) and estimated IV regression of MSA-level fertility rates on MSA-level
house prices during the 19972006 housing boom period. Their IV estimates demonstrated that
short-term (one-year) increases in house prices led to a decline in births in places where the
homeownership rate was relatively low. However, this decline was outweighed by the increase in
births where the homeownership rate was relatively high. That is to say, similarly to Lovenheim
and Mumford (2013), they found fertility rates for homeowners were positively associated with
short-term increases in house prices. In sum, at the mean US home ownership rate in their sam-
ple period, the net e¤ect of a $10,000 increase in house prices produced a 0.8 percent increase in
fertility rates. They also conrmed the ndings of previous analysis using aggregate-level data
with individual-level Current Population Survey data. At this stage, they considered MSA-level
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house prices conditional on MSA xed e¤ects to control for endogenous sorting into higher- or
lower-priced MSAs.
These estimates appear to predict that a housing market decline may have a symmetric neg-
ative impact on fertility. If true, it may help us to understand whether the severe price declines
in the housing market following the US subprime mortgage crisis is one of the reasons for the
fairly sharp decline in the US birth rate. To examine this hypothesis, Lovenheim and Mumford
(2013) used the 16.8 percent of the subsample that experienced price declines. Although they
found some evidence that the response was not symmetric, they also found that the e¤ect of
falls in home values was not statistically di¤erent from zero. This suggests that fertility deci-
sions are less likely to respond to housing market variation during a period of house price falls.
Lovenheim and Mumford (2013), however, suggested that more work examining the e¤ect of the
housing bust on fertility was needed in the future when data from the period of the housing bust
became available. On the other hand, Dettling and Kearney (2014) used data from the housing
bust period of 199096, and conducted a similar exercise. The empirical results from this period
are similar to the housing boom period, supporting a symmetric negative impact.4 They also
conrmed similar results during the recent housing bust period of 200710, even though only
individual-level data were used because MSA-level fertility rates were not available at the time.
In sum, Dettling and Kearney (2014) suggested that fertility responses tend to be symmetric
irrespective of the rise or fall of house prices, whereas Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) suggested
that fertility is more likely to respond when house prices increase than decline. However, both
these results are largely inconsistent with prospect theory, which suggests that households care
more about wealth losses than equivalent gains.
3 The theory of childbirth and housing wealth
Let us dene Bt as a parameter indicating the propensity to undergo a birth at time t, which
is endogenously selected by families dwelling in owner-occupied housing. If families do not have
a birth, then Bt = 0, whereas if they do, then Bt = 1. We treat Bt as a continuous variable
4However, they argued that the impact appeared to be symmetric because the sign of the coe¢ cients was
similar in both the housing bust and housing boom periods. Importantly, they did not consider the magnitude of
the coe¢ cients.
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that ranges from zero to one, because it allows us to di¤erentiate the objective function, as
shown below. Therefore, Bt represents the probability of childbirth in our context. Let us dene
U(Bt) as the utility from expecting to have a child and C(Bt) as the cost function. Assume
that U 0(Bt) > 0, U 00(Bt) < 0, C 0(Bt) > 0, and C 00(Bt) = 0. The household surplus from having
a child can then be written as U(Bt)   C(Bt). To introduce the impact of housing wealth on
utility, assume that the utility function U(Bt) is weighted by a value function that depends
on current housing wealth, Wt. In this analysis, we assume Wt is exogenous for families. The
value function captures that the behavior of family members is a¤ected by the estimated value
of their housing. We dene the house price in the prior year Wt 1 as the reference wealth level.
To apply the theory of reference-dependent preferences, the optimal level of Bt is then chosen
by maximizing the following modied surplus functions:
U(Bt)(Wt)  C(Bt) if Wt Wt 1;
U(Bt)	(Wt)  C(Bt) if Wt Wt 1;
where (Wt) and 	(Wt) represent the value functions. The value functions are assumed to
follow diminishing marginal utility over wealth. That is, 0(Wt) > 0, 00(Wt) < 0, 	0(Wt) > 0,
and 	00(Wt) < 0.
Assume (A1) (Wt 1) = 	(Wt 1). This assumption ensures that the value functions take
the same value at the reference point. Assume also that (A2) 0(Wt 1) < 	0(Wt 1). This
assumption reects that families are loss averse: that is, they are more sensitive to losses than
gains, resulting in a greater marginal utility change for losses (Tversky and Kahneman 1991).
The rst-order condition for the above problems is:
U 0(Bt)(Wt)  C 0(Bt) if Wt Wt 1;
U 0(Bt)	(Wt)  C 0(Bt) if W Wt 1:
Let us denote Bt as the optimal level atWt =Wt 1. Di¤erentiating the rst-order condition
with respect to housing wealth at Wt =Wt 1 can be written as:
dBt
dWt

Wt=Wt 1
=
8>><>>:
  U
0(Bt )
U 00(Bt )
0(Wt 1)
(Wt 1)
> 0 if Wt Wt 1;
  U
0(Bt )
U 00(Bt )
	0(Wt 1)
	(Wt 1)
> 0 if W Wt 1:
(1)
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Because 0(Wt 1)=(Wt 1) < 	0(Wt 1)=	(Wt 1) by assumptions (A1) and (A2), equation (1)
demonstrates that the optimal propensity to have a child is kinked at the reference housing
wealth and that the marginal propensity with respect to an exogenous increase in housing
wealth is discontinuously higher below the kink than above it. This suggests a negative e¤ect
on fertility because the decline in house prices from the reference point is more pronounced than
the positive e¤ect on fertility, as derived from an unexpected rise in house prices.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data and variables
Our empirical analysis draws on the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS) to examine the
relationship between housing wealth and the fertility decisions of homeowners. The KHPS,
sponsored by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), is a nationally represen-
tative, large-scale longitudinal survey of Japanese households that commenced in 2004 with an
initial sample of approximately 4,000 households. In 2007, a random refreshment sample of
approximately 1,400 new respondents addressed panel attrition. In the following analysis, we
use eight waves of the KHPS from 2004 to 2011. The KHPS is particularly suited to address-
ing the research questions in this paper because it contains detailed information on household
demographic events, including childbirth, the tenure mode of housing and housing wealth, and
includes a rich set of family background characteristics.
In the following analysis, a dichotomous variable indicating childbirth represents the event
of interest. This variable takes a value of one if the respondent family had a new baby in the
last 12 months, and zero otherwise. Duration is dened as follows: 1) years since marriage for
those without any child; 2) years since last childbirth for those having at least one existing child.
The KHPS also provides information on the value of the home if it is owned.5 Similar
to Lovenheim and Mumford (2013), our housing wealth measure is constructed based on self-
reported information in the survey (How much do you think the house and lot would sell for
on todays market?). One could be skeptical about the use of self-reported house values as
5There are no publicly available data for housing prices in Japan, except the JREI Home Price Indices, which
are geographically limited to the Tokyo metropolitan area.
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a proxy for market values. The owners valuation can be inaccurate and include a systematic
bias toward optimistic evaluation. In fact, Kiel and Zabel (1999) showed that the average owner
overstates their house value by 5.1%. Using self-reported house values can pose a serious problem
in our application if the measurement errors in an owners valuation are correlated with birth
behavior. This can be possible if there are some omitted variables in our model that are also
correlated with self-reported house values. Again, however, Kiel and Zabel (1999) showed that
valuation errors are not correlated with owners individual characteristics as well as the house
and neighborhood attributes. Furthermore, because our housing wealth measure is the change
in self-reported values, problems arising from systematic overvaluation can be largely mitigated.
In fact, several previous studies have shown that ownersvaluations result in accurate estimates
of house price indices (Kiel and Zabel 1999; Lovenheim 2011). Overall, we believe that using self-
reported values will represent only a minor problem in our specic application. In the following
analysis, we assume that the reference wealth level is dened as the status quo, that is, the
self-reported value in the previous year, Wt 1. This is a standard assumption in the literature
where the reference state corresponds to the decision makers current endowment (Tversky and
Kahneman 1991; Dettling and Kearney 2013).
In addition to these variables, we gather a number of important economic and demographic
characteristics from the KHPS. These include a dummy variable indicating the number of exist-
ing children prior to the new childbirth in question, the female respondents age and its square,
the level of completed education (high school, technical college/vocational school, two-year col-
lege, and four-year college or higher), employment status (not employed, employed part-time,
and employed full-time), and male respondents labor earnings.6 We also control for region, city
size, and survey year using dummy variables in each of our estimations. All monetary variables
are converted to 2005 prices using the Consumer Price Index.
The original survey includes 4,005 households in 2004 (wave 1) with 1,419 households added
in 2007, resulting in 5,424 unique households. Of these households, 870 households participated
in the survey only once (i.e., dropped out in the second wave). As we use lagged information
6Womens employment careers are likely to be interrupted by childbirth and infant care, leading to a typical
reverse-causality problem. Therefore, for the employment status, we specify our dummy variables according to
the status prior to the childbirth.
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(i.e., household and housing characteristics from the previous wave) in our empirical analysis,
we exclude these households, resulting in 4,554 unique households.
As our purpose is to identify the impact of self-reported house values on childbirth, we re-
stricted our sample to homeowners who did not move during the survey period. For mover house-
holds, changes in self-reported house values cannot be interpreted as real house price changes.
Furthermore, house values can increase through additions and/or repairs, even when market
prices are stable. We therefore exclude homeowners that made any additions and/or repairs to
their home from our sample. This reduced our sample further to 3,407 unique households.
The sample was further restricted to households with a married woman of childbearing age,
i.e., a female respondent aged between 20 and 50 years. This reduced the number of unique
households further to 1,250. This reduction is substantial because the KHPS covers both single-
person (unmarried) households and the elderly. Finally, restricting the sample to those where
all necessary information was available further reduced the number of unique households to 932.
Taking each household-year pair as a unit of observation, our estimation is based on a total of
2,893 observations.
Table 1 provides selected descriptive statistics for our variables. The childbirth dummy
has an average value of approximately 0.02, indicating we have a total of 60 births in our
observations during the sample period. One reason for this low value may be that the average
age of female respondents is approximately 41 years, as reported in Table 1, and they already
have approximately two children on average (not shown). The mean self-reported home values
is approximately 23.1 million yen (not shown). On average, home values decreased by about 1.5
million yen during the sample period.
Figure 2 illustrates the average self-reported home values over time. As shown, the average
house values increased from 2006 to 2007. Afterwards, house values steadily declined until 2010
where they remained through to 2011. The average self-reported home values in the Tokyo
metropolitan area also display the same tendency. However, from 2010 to 2011, average self-
reported home values increased in the Tokyo metropolitan area.
Table 2 highlights the di¤erences in variables for respondents who responded depending
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on whether they had experienced housing price gains or losses. For the sake of simplicity, we
categorize these into housing wealth gainers and losers, where the former also includes those
who reported the same house value as the previous year (524 observations).7 Approximately
half of the observations showed price increases. For these, home values increased approximately
4.3 million yen on average. Excluding households that reported Wt = Wt 1, the average price
appreciation was 6.6 million yen. The remaining half of the observations experienced price
declines. For these, home values decreased approximately 7.6 million yen on average. In sum,
our dataset appears to cover well both housing wealth gainers and losers.
4.2 Econometric model
Because our data are in the form of panel data, we analyze decisions on childbirth within the
framework of a duration model. We thus modify the notation of our theoretical model, such
that instead of Bt, we use the birth hazard rate B(t). The birth hazard rate is the probability
that childbirth is realized, given that the birth interval lasts at least until t. Our benchmark
proportional hazard model can be written as:
B(t) = B0(t;Y;M) exp

Gd[WtWt 1]

Wt  Wt 1
Wt 1

+ Ld[Wt<Wt 1]

Wt  Wt 1
Wt 1

+ X(t)

;
(2)
where B0 is an unknown baseline hazard at t. In order to control for underlying heterogeneity
in birth behavior, we stratify the baseline hazard by the year of birth (Y ) and the year in which
households moved into the current residence (M).8 This allows us to control for cohort e¤ects, as
suggested by Hashimoto and Kondo (2012), and the e¤ects of di¤erent housing market conditions
at the time of home purchase. For the latter, Öst (2012) suggested that institutional factors
in the housing market, such as the housing subsidies and tax benets associated with home
purchase, can potentially a¤ect subsequent birth behavior. X(t) is a set of other explanatory
variables, and  is the corresponding parameter vector. d[A] is an indicator function that takes
7However, whether we include these households with the housing gainers does not fundamentally change our
results. See the discussion in Section 4.4.
8 In the estimation, we classify female respondents into three groups based on their birth year (born in and
before 1959, born between 1960 and 1969, and born in and after 1970) and into six groups based on the year in
which the woman moved into her current residence (in and before 1959, between 1960 and 1969, between 1970
and 1979, between 1980 and 1989, between 1990 and 1999, and in and after 2000). As a result, we allow for
di¤erent baseline hazard functions for 18 subgroups (3 6).
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a value of one if the event A is true, and zero otherwise. Therefore, holding all other things
constant, the e¤ect of the annual percentage changes in housing wealth on the birth hazard
rate can be represented by G if Wt  Wt 1, and L if Wt < Wt 1. Our theoretical model
predicts that the optimal propensity to have a child is kinked at the reference housing wealth
and that the marginal propensity with respect to an exogenous increase in housing wealth is
discontinuously higher below the kink than above it. This implies that G < L.
4.3 Empirical results
As a preliminary step, we begin by considering a simpler model excluding any asymmetric impact
of housing wealth on fertility decisions. Specically, we estimate the model given by equation
(2) with the restriction that G = L. We estimate the model by applying a standard Coxs
proportional hazard model for childbirth. Table 3 presents the empirical results. The results
in column [1] show that a short-term increase in house prices is positively associated with the
homeowners probability of giving birth in a given year. This result is consistent with previous
ndings in the literature. However, Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) and Dettling and Kearney
(2014) used data from a housing boom period, while our data include both housing boom and
bust periods. The signicantly positive sign indicates that during a housing boom (bust) period,
an increase (decrease) in house prices leads to a positive (negative) wealth e¤ect on the fertility
decisions of homeowners. In addition, we also present regression results using an alternative
specication for the housing wealth measure, i.e., annual changes in the level of self-reported
house values (Wt  Wt 1), in column [2] of Table 3. These results also suggest that short-term
increases in house prices are positively associated with the homeowners probability of giving
birth.
In terms of the demographic and family background variables, our results are as follows.
Female respondents age has a signicant nonlinear e¤ect on childbirth. The estimated results
show that the probability of giving birth increases through the female respondents 20s, reaching
a maximum at around 30, and then decreasing throughout the respondents 30s and 40s. The
number of existing children is signicantly and negatively associated with the probability of have
an additional birth (not shown). The education of the female respondent also matters in that
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respondents with a four-year college or postgraduate degree tend to have a signicantly lower
probability of giving birth. As expected, female employment status is associated with childbirth.
Compared with respondents not working, the probability of giving birth is considerably lower
for those working part or full time (in year t   1), although the estimated coe¢ cient is not
signicant in the case of the latter.
Given these preliminary results, we now test the asymmetric impact of housing wealth on the
fertility decision. The results are in columns [3] and [4] of Table 3. The null hypothesis of equal
wealth coe¢ cients, H0 : G = L, is tested against the one-sided alternative Ha : G < L. From
column [3], we nd that the estimated coe¢ cient on short-term increases in housing values is
signicantly positive when Wt < Wt 1 (coef. = 2.684). In comparison, the estimated coe¢ cient
on short-term increases is still positive but considerably smaller and statistically insignicant
when Wt  Wt 1 (coef. = 0.227). This is consistent with our theoretical prediction that the
fertility responses of homeowners are substantially larger when their housing wealth is below
its reference level than when housing wealth is above its reference level. As a result, the null
hypothesis of equal wealth coe¢ cients, H0 : G = L, is strongly rejected. The results in column
[4] using annual changes in the level of house values yield qualitatively similar ndings.
In order to evaluate the results in column [3] quantitatively, we calculate the predicted e¤ect
of a one million yen change in house prices on the birth hazard rate. Given that the average
house value in our dataset is 23.1 million yen, a one million yen change translates into a relative
house value change of 0.043, which is close to the mean rate of change given in Table 2 (0.042).
Our coe¢ cient estimate of L suggests that households facing a one million yen decrease in
their house values were approximately 10.9 percent less likely to have an additional birth in the
following year (1   e 0:043L = 0:109). Conversely, a one million yen increase in house values
corresponds to a mere 1.0 percent increase in the hazard rate (e 0:043G = 1:010).
4.4 Robustness checks
The remainder of this section reports the results of additional specications to assess the robust-
ness of our main ndings. We estimate three alternative models in addition to our benchmark
model. These results are summarized in Table 4. In column [1], we use house value changes
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in the past two years, (Wt  Wt 2) =Wt 2, as an alternative wealth measure. This enables us
to examine longer-term e¤ects of housing wealth changes on childbirth. The estimated results
show qualitatively the same pattern as our benchmark results.
As we assume that the reference wealth level coincides with the status quo (Wt 1), any
measurement errors in past house values can bias our results. Measurement error in past house
values presumably poses a particularly serious problem if current housing wealth is not so dif-
ferent from the reference wealth level (i.e., Wt  Wt 1). This is because only a small amount
of measurement error in the past house values can change whether a particular household has
housing wealth above (or below) the reference level. Therefore, in column [2] of Table 4, we
exclude households that report the same self-reported house values across adjacent years, i.e.,
Wt = Wt 1. Because 524 households reported exactly the same house values across adjacent
years, this substantially reduces our sample size. The estimated results presented in column
[2], however, are qualitatively similar to our benchmark results. The estimated coe¢ cient on
housing losses (coef. = 3.112) is somewhat larger than in our benchmark result, but we continue
to observe an asymmetric wealth e¤ect. We therefore believe that measurement errors do not
pose serious problems in our estimation.
In column [3] of Table 4, we estimate the same model using the sample households that
already had at least one child (i.e., second and subsequent births) in order to examine whether
homeownersfertility responses di¤er for rst and subsequent births (Lovenheim and Mumford
2013). The estimated coe¢ cient on housing losses turns out to be larger than in our benchmark
result, consistent with previous ndings. While fertility responses for rst births might be
interpreted as changes in the optimal timing of childbirth, those for second and subsequent
births may represent changes in the total number of children. Therefore, our results suggest that
housing wealth a¤ects not only the timing of childbirth but also the total number of children.
In Table 5 we present several alternative models allowing for more exible specications of
housing gains/losses. In column [1], we added a dummy variable indicating whether respondents
experienced housing gains. Our theoretical model assumes that the value function is continuous
at the reference point (assumption A1). Consistent with this assumption, the additional dummy
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variable has a statistically insignicant coe¢ cient estimate for childbirth. In addition, the
coe¢ cient estimates for changes in self-reported house values are quantitatively similar to our
benchmark results in column [3] of Table 3.
In column [2] of Table 5, we adopt a quadratic specication for both housing gains and
losses. This specication is useful for testing whether the asymmetric housing wealth responses
in the benchmark results are driven by potential nonlinearity of the e¤ects of the housing gains
and losses. The estimated results, however, indicate that the quadratic terms for housing gains
and losses are both statistically insignicant, implying that the underlying relationship between
housing wealth and fertility may not be (at least quadratically) nonlinear.9
Up to now, we have exclusively focused on existing homeowners to evaluate the e¤ects of
housing wealth on childbirth. As discussed earlier, a rise in house prices will increase the available
resources of homeowners, and may lead to a positive e¤ect on fertility decisions. An increase in
house prices, on the other hand, will have the opposite e¤ect on prospective owners (i.e., renters),
as this will require a larger deposit for future home purchases and reduce the available resources
for these households. In order to examine the e¤ects of housing price changes on renters, we
derive year-on-year changes in regional house prices by regressing the homeowners self-reported
values on regioncity size xed e¤ects.10 The estimation results for the house value regression
imposing an AR(2) process are in Table 6. We obtains the predicted house value changes for
each regioncity sizeyear combination using these results.
Table 7 provides our estimation results using regional house value changes. The rst two
columns present the regression results for homeowners. In column [1], although the coe¢ cient
estimate is not statistically signicant, we can see that changes in regional house values have a
positive e¤ect on childbirth. In addition, allowing for an asymmetric e¤ect, as in column [2] of
Table 7, we can see that changes in regional house values have a signicantly positive coe¢ cient
9 Instead of rate changes in self-reported values, we use absolute change in self-reported values and its square.
Although we were unable to stratify the baseline hazard because of a problem with convergence, a quadratic
specication ts both housing gains and losses well. Even with this quadratic specication, we still nd that
the fertility responses are asymmetric in terms of housing gains and losses. That is, housing losses have a larger
impact on fertility than do gains of an equivalent size.
10KHPS categorizes a respondents location of residence in eight regions (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu,
Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu) and three city sizes (20 major cities, other smaller cities, and
towns/villages). Based on this information, we created dummy variables for every possible combination of regions,
city sizes, and survey years, and used them to control for xed e¤ects in Table 6.
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estimate only when regional house values decrease. Overall, the estimated coe¢ cients on housing
wealth variables display a qualitatively similar pattern as our benchmark case in columns [1]
and [3] of Table 3, implying that our predicted house value changes well capture any regional
house price variation. The regression results for renter households are in column [3]. As shown,
regional house price changes have a negative, although not statistically signicant, impact on
renter fertility decisions (Lovenheim and Mumford 2013).
5 Conclusion
This paper estimated the responses of homeowner childbirth to changes in housing wealth using
recent longitudinal data on Japanese households. The main contribution of our analysis is to
highlight the role of reference-dependent preferences, as assumed by prospect theory, in explain-
ing household fertility decisions and their relationship with changes in housing wealth. Using
the empirical specications commonly used in existing studies, we found that the propensity
to have a child is positively associated with housing wealth changes. This suggests that a de-
crease in housing wealth has a symmetric negative impact on fertility decisions. However, our
empirical specications, which allow for a di¤erent impact on childbirth depending on gains or
losses in housing prices, supported our arguments that the fertility responses of homeowners are
substantially larger when housing wealth is below its reference level than when housing wealth
is above its reference level. The empirical results demonstrated that homeowners facing a one
million yen decrease in house values from the previous year were approximately 10.9 percent
less likely to have an additional birth in the next year, while a one million yen increase in house
values lead to a mere 1.0 percent greater likelihood of giving birth. This is consistent with
the theoretical model of prospect theory that predicts disproportionately higher wealth e¤ects
on childbirth when housing prices fall below some reference level. The empirical ndings were
robust to alternative specications.
We do not intend to argue against other reasons explaining the evidence presented here.
In some countries, the budget constraint of homeowners shifts di¤erently for housing price
gains and losses. This could also apply in the Japanese case. Throughout the 1990s and into
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the early 2000s, many Japanese homeowners encountered negative equity because the loss in
housing value was substantial. To address this problem, the government revised the tax system
in 2004 such that households could deduct capital losses on property held for personal use.
Seko and Sumita (2007) focused on the 2004 tax revisions and found that they increased home
replacement, especially for households with a large loan-to-value ratio. In our context, the 2004
tax revisions may impact on the budget constraint only when homeowners realize a loss on
their house; accordingly, housing wealth has an asymmetric impact on childbirth. However, to
capture this impact, the reference wealth level must be the purchase price rather than the price
in the previous year, because capital gains and losses are based on the purchase price. To repeat,
we use the house price in the prior year as the reference wealth level. Instead, the asymmetric
housing wealth e¤ect on childbirth through the value function may be an additional explanation
(Genesove and Mayer 2001; Case et al. 2013). In fact, Nakagawa and Saito (2012) have suggested
that Japanese people tend to behave as expected by prospect theory using survey data that asked
apartment residents in the Tokyo metropolitan area to select their preferred investment plan for
mitigating earthquake risk.
It is useful to consider the policy implication of this paper. To increase the fertility rate of
homeowners, a government may attempt to raise house values. However, our empirical evidence
regarding the asymmetric housing wealth e¤ect indicates that this kind of policy may be valid
only when housing prices have a downward trend. That is, policy may not dramatically improve
the fertility rates of homeowners during a boom phase, because housing wealth has such a small
impact on childbirth during this time.
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Table	1:	Summary	statistics	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable	 Mean Std.	Dev.
Childbirth†	 0.021	 0.143	
Changes	in	house	value	ሺin	10	million	yenሻ –0.149	 1.908	
Age	ሺin	yearsሻ	 41.323	 5.428	
Education†	
	 High	school	 0.455	 0.498	
	 Technical	college/vocational	school	 0.073	 0.260	
Two‐year	college	 0.316	 0.465	
Four‐year	college	or	higher	 0.148	 0.355	
Employment	status†	
Not	employed	 0.330	 0.470	
	 Employed	part	time	 0.355	 0.479	
Employed	full	time	 0.299	 0.458	
Husband’s	labor	income	ሺin	million	yenሻ 6.450	 3.190	
Observations	 	 2,893
Notes:	†	denotes	a	dummy	variable.	Changes	in	house	value	measured	by	the	difference	
between	 ௧ܹ	 and	 ௧ܹିଵ.	
Table	2:	Changes	in	house	values	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 	
	 	 Rate	 ሺ ௧ܹ െ ௧ܹିଵሻ ௧ܹିଵ⁄ Difference	 ሺ ௧ܹ െ ௧ܹିଵሻ
	 Observations	 Mean Std.	Dev. Mean Std.	Dev.
Full	sample	 2,893	 0.042 0.895 –0.149	 1.908
Gains	 ሺ ௧ܹ ൒ ௧ܹିଵሻ	 1,485	 0.319 1.170 0.426 1.183
Losses	 ሺ ௧ܹ ൏ ௧ܹିଵሻ	 1,408	 –0.250 0.187 –0.755	 2.301
Table	3:	Benchmark	results	for	Cox’s	proportional	hazard	estimates	
	 ሾ1ሿ ሾ2ሿ ሾ3ሿ ሾ4ሿ	
	 Rate Difference Rate Difference
Changes	in	house	value	 0.354*** 0.158* 	
	 ሺ0.129ሻ	 ሺ0.085ሻ	 	
Gains	in	house	value	 ሺߚீሻ	 0.227	 0.084
	 ሺ0.146ሻ	 	 ሺ0.087ሻ	
Losses	in	house	value	 ሺߚ௅ሻ	 2.684***	 0.893***
	 ሺ0.713ሻ	 	 ሺ0.287ሻ	
Age	 2.112*** 2.361*** 2.116***	 2.106***
	 ሺ0.599ሻ	 ሺ0.696ሻ	 ሺ0.571ሻ	 	 ሺ0.623ሻ	
Age‐squared	 –3.236*** –3.648*** –3.250***	 –3.265***
	 ሺ0.895ሻ	 ሺ1.052ሻ	 ሺ0.852ሻ	 	 ሺ0.943ሻ	
Education	ሺref:	high	schoolሻ	 	
Technical	college/vocational	school	 0.494 0.616 0.398	 0.545
	 ሺ0.494ሻ	 ሺ0.468ሻ	 ሺ0.476ሻ	 	 ሺ0.428ሻ	
Two‐year	college	 –0.495 –0.421 –0.517	 –0.451
	 ሺ0.334ሻ	 ሺ0.324ሻ	 ሺ0.328ሻ	 	 ሺ0.318ሻ	
Four‐year	college	or	above	 –1.211*** –1.178*** –1.263***	 –1.244***
	 ሺ0.449ሻ	 ሺ0.452ሻ	 ሺ0.475ሻ	 	 ሺ0.467ሻ	
Employment	status	ሺref:	not	employedሻ 	
Employed	part	time	 –1.200*** –1.151*** –1.302***	 –1.213***
	 ሺ0.446ሻ	 ሺ0.444ሻ	 ሺ0.468ሻ	 	 ሺ0.446ሻ	
Employed	full	time	 –0.255 –0.323 –0.311	 –0.361
	 ሺ0.307ሻ	 ሺ0.312ሻ	 ሺ0.321ሻ	 	 ሺ0.317ሻ	
Husband’s	labor	income –0.050 –0.046 –0.046	 –0.044
	 ሺ0.058ሻ	 ሺ0.058ሻ	 ሺ0.056ሻ	 	 ሺ0.056ሻ	
Wald	tests	 10.96***	 6.87***
ሾ݌‐valueሿ	 ሾ0.000ሿ	 	 ሾ0.004ሿ	
Log‐likelihood	 –166.38 –167.09 –163.78	 –165.01
Pseudo	 ܴଶ	 0.163	 0.160	 0.176	 	 0.171	
Notes:	 Number	 of	 observations	 is	 2,893.	 Robust	 standard	 errors	 clustered	 by	 household	 ID	 are	 in	 parentheses.	 Dummy	
variables	for	the	number	of	existing	children,	region,	city	size,	and	survey	year	are	included	but	estimates	are	not	shown.	The	
baseline	hazard	is	stratified	by	birth	cohort	and	the	year	moved	into	current	residence.	Age‐squared	divided	by	100.	The	null	
hypothesis	 of	 ߚீ ൌ ߚ௅	 is	 tested	 using	 one‐sided	Wald	 tests	 against	 the	 alternative	 of	 ߚீ ൏ ߚ௅.	 The	 test	 statistics	 have	 a	
chi‐squared	distribution	with	one	degree	of	freedom. ***,	and	* indicate	significance	at	the	0.01	and	0.10	levels,	respectively.
 
  
Table	4:	Robustness	checks	of	Cox’s	proportional	hazard	estimates	
	 ሾ1ሿ ሾ2ሿ ሾ3ሿ	
	 Past	2	years Without	 ௧ܹ ൌ ௧ܹିଵ	No.	of	children	 ൒ 1
Gains	in	house	value	 ሺߚீሻ	 1.021** 0.148 0.153	
	 ሺ0.483ሻ	 ሺ0.146ሻ	 ሺ0.148ሻ	 	
Losses	in	house	value	 ሺߚ௅ሻ	 2.071*** 3.112*** 3.198***	
	 ሺ0.755ሻ	 ሺ0.792ሻ	 ሺ0.969ሻ	 	
Age	 2.085** 2.157*** 2.494***	
	 ሺ0.910ሻ	 ሺ0.602ሻ	 ሺ0.701ሻ	 	
Age‐squared	 –3.282** –3.353*** –3.788***	
	 ሺ1.341ሻ	 ሺ0.901ሻ	 ሺ1.043ሻ	 	
Education	ሺref:	high	schoolሻ	 	
Technical	college/vocational	school	 –1.071* 0.008 0.185	
	 ሺ0.628ሻ	 ሺ0.577ሻ	 ሺ0.609ሻ	 	
Two‐year	college	 –0.893** –0.594 –0.511	
	 ሺ0.413ሻ	 ሺ0.370ሻ	 ሺ0.393ሻ	 	
Four‐year	college	or	above	 –1.591*** –1.168** –1.608**	
	 ሺ0.585ሻ	 ሺ0.495ሻ	 ሺ0.685ሻ	 	
Employment	status	ሺref:	not	employedሻ 	
Employed	part	time	 –1.628*** –1.190** –1.245**	
	 ሺ0.548ሻ	 ሺ0.482ሻ	 ሺ0.574ሻ	 	
Employed	full	time	 –0.729 –0.480 –0.357	
	 ሺ0.455ሻ	 ሺ0.356ሻ	 ሺ0.452ሻ	 	
Husband’s	labor	income –0.131** –0.094 –0.115	
	 ሺ0.063ሻ	 ሺ0.078ሻ	 ሺ0.089ሻ	 	
Wald	tests	 1.29 12.59*** 9.24***	
ሾ݌‐valueሿ	 ሾ0.128ሿ	 ሾ0.000ሿ	 ሾ0.001ሿ	 	
Log‐likelihood	 –101.74 –129.12 –115.38	
Pseudo	 ܴଶ	 0.171	 0.200 0.189	 	
Observations	 2,202	 2,369	 2,707	 	
Notes:	 House	 value	 specification	 is	 rates.	 Robust	 standard	 errors	 clustered	 by	 household	 ID	 are	 in	 parentheses.	 Dummy	
variables	 for	 the	number	 of	 existing	 children,	 region,	 city	 size,	 and	 survey	year	 are	 included	but	 results	 are	not	 shown.	 In	
model	 ሾ1ሿ,	 region	 dummies	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	model	 because	 of	 a	 problem	with	 convergence.	 The	 baseline	 hazard	 is	
stratified	 by	 birth	 cohort	 and	 the	 year	moved	 into	 current	 residence.	 Age‐squared	 divided	 by	 100.	 The	 null	 hypothesis	 of	
ߚீ ൌ ߚ௅	 is	 tested	 using	 one‐sided	 Wald	 tests	 against	 the	 alternative	 of	 ߚீ ൏ ߚ௅.	 The	 test	 statistics	 have	 a	 chi‐squared	
distribution	with	one	degree	of	freedom.	***,	**,	and	* indicate	significance at	the	0.01,	0.05, and	0.10	levels,	respectively.
  
Table	5:	Alternative	specifications	of	housing	gains/losses	of	Cox’s	proportional	hazard	estimates	
	 ሾ1ሿ ሾ2ሿ
Gains	in	house	value	 0.260* 0.268	
	 ሺ0.150ሻ	 ሺ0.538ሻ	 	
Gains	in	house	value	squared	 –0.005	
	 ሺ0.108ሻ	 	
Losses	in	house	value	 3.559*** 1.149	
	 ሺ1.195ሻ	 ሺ2.182ሻ	 	
Losses	in	house	value	squared	 –3.274	
	 ሺ5.001ሻ	 	
Housing	gains	dummy	 ሺ ௧ܹ ൒ ௧ܹሻ	 –0.382
	 ሺ0.391ሻ	
Age	 2.190*** 2.188***	
	 ሺ0.608ሻ	 ሺ0.597ሻ	 	
Age‐squared	 –3.356*** –3.350***	
	 ሺ0.905ሻ	 ሺ0.888ሻ	 	
Education	ሺref:	high	schoolሻ	
Technical	college/vocational	school	 0.368 0.410	
	 ሺ0.483ሻ	 ሺ0.481ሻ	 	
Two‐year	college	 –0.546 –0.525	
	 ሺ0.341ሻ	 ሺ0.329ሻ	 	
Four‐year	college	or	above	 –1.294*** –1.266***	
	 ሺ0.471ሻ	 ሺ0.468ሻ	 	
Employment	status	ሺref:	not	employedሻ
Employed	part	time	 –1.306*** –1.292***	
	 ሺ0.478ሻ	 ሺ0.474ሻ	 	
Employed	full	time	 –0.289 –0.286	
	 ሺ0.314ሻ	 ሺ0.312ሻ	 	
Husband’s	labor	income –0.047 –0.048	
	 ሺ0.054ሻ	 ሺ0.056ሻ	 	
Wald	tests	 7.80*** 4.77**	
ሾ݌‐valueሿ	 ሾ0.003ሿ	 ሾ0.046ሿ	 	
Log‐likelihood	 –163.39 –163.59	
Pseudo	 ܴଶ	 0.178	 0.177	 	
Notes:	Number	of	observations is	2,893.	House	value	specification	is rate.	Robust	standard	errors	clustered	by	household	ID	
are	in	parentheses.	Dummy	variables	for	the	number	of	existing	children,	region,	city	size,	and	survey	year	are	included	but	
results	 are	 not	 shown.	 In	 model	 ሾ1ሿ,	 the	 baseline	 hazard	 is	 stratified	 by	 birth	 cohort	 and	 the	 year	 moved	 into	 current	
residence.	The	null	hypothesis	of	 ߚீ ൌ ߚ௅	 is	tested	using	one‐sided	Wald	tests	against	the	alternative	of	 ߚீ ൏ ߚ௅.	For	model	
ሾ2ሿ,	 the	 joint	 hypothesis	 of	 equal	 coefficients	 on	 linear	 and	 quadratic	 gains/loss	 terms	 is	 tested.	 The	 test	 statistics	 have	 a	
chi‐squared	distribution	with	one/two	degrees	of	freedom.	***,	**, and	* indicate	significance at	the	0.01,	0.05,	and	0.10	levels,	
respectively. 
 
 Table	6:	ARሺ2ሻ	estimates	for	self‐reported	house	values	
	 House	value
Self‐reported	house	value	 ሺݐ െ 1ሻ	 0.068	
	 ሺ0.043ሻ	
Self‐reported	house	value	 ሺݐ െ 2ሻ	 0.108***
	 ሺ0.015ሻ	
Constant	 1.771***
	 ሺ0.209ሻ	
Notes:	Number	of	observations	 is	4,810.	Model	 is	estimated	using	Arellano–
Bond	dynamic	panel	GMM	estimator.	Dummy	variables	 for	region–city	size–
year	combinations,	i.e.,	 region ൈ city	size ൈ year,	are	included	but	results	not	
shown.	***	indicates	significance	at	the	0.01	level.	
  
Table	7:	Cox’s	proportional	hazard	estimates	using	regional	average	house	value	changes	
	 ሾ1ሿ ሾ2ሿ ሾ3ሿ	
	 Homeowners Homeowners Renters	
Changes	in	house	value	 0.083 –1.189	
	 ሺ1.046ሻ	 ሺ1.697ሻ	 	
Gains	in	house	value	 ሺߚீሻ	 –3.218 	
	 ሺ2.531ሻ	 	
Losses	in	house	value	 ሺߚ௅ሻ	 3.641* 	
	 ሺ2.169ሻ	 	
Age	 0.498 0.721** 0.466	
	 ሺ0.347ሻ	 ሺ0.334ሻ	 ሺ0.369ሻ	 	
Age‐squared	 	 	 –0.909* –1.282*** –0.945*	
	 ሺ0.516ሻ	 ሺ0.479ሻ	 ሺ0.544ሻ	 	
Education	ሺref:	high	schoolሻ	 	
Technical	college/vocational	school	 –0.043 –0.079 –0.243	
	 ሺ0.329ሻ	 ሺ0.326ሻ	 ሺ0.567ሻ	 	
Two‐year	college	 –0.501 –0.533 0.865**	
	 ሺ0.378ሻ	 ሺ0.371ሻ	 ሺ0.350ሻ	 	
Four‐year	college	or	above	 –0.510 –0.472 1.448***	
	 ሺ0.386ሻ	 ሺ0.371ሻ	 ሺ0.385ሻ	 	
Employment	status	ሺref:	not	employedሻ 	
Employed	part	time	 –0.655** –0.670** –1.254***	
	 ሺ0.301ሻ	 ሺ0.295ሻ	 ሺ0.368ሻ	 	
Employed	full	time	 –0.713** –0.734*** –0.606*	
	 ሺ0.285ሻ	 ሺ0.283ሻ	 ሺ0.350ሻ	 	
Husband’s	labor	income –0.023 –0.038 –0.005	
	 ሺ0.055ሻ	 ሺ0.056ሻ	 ሺ0.042ሻ	 	
Wald	tests	 2.87** 	
ሾ݌‐valueሿ	 ሾ0.045ሿ 	
Log‐likelihood	 –262.63 –283.76 –198.90	
Pseudo	 ܴଶ	 0.088	 0.121	 0.104	 	
Observations	 3,537	 3,537	 901	 	
Notes:	 House	 value	 specification	 is	 change	 in	 rate.	 Robust	 standard	 errors	 clustered	 by	 household	 ID	 are	 in	 parentheses.	
Dummy	variables	for	the	number	of	existing	children,	region,	city	size,	and	survey	year	are	included	but	results	are	not	shown.	
The	 baseline	 hazard	 is	 stratified	 by	 birth	 cohort	 and	 the	 year	moved	 into	 current	 residence.	 Age‐squared	 divided	 by	 100.	
Predicted	house	value	changes	ሺfor	each	region–city	size–year	combinationሻ	are	from	estimation	results	in	Table	6.	Estimation	
sample	is	existing	homeowners	for	results	in	models	ሾ1ሿ	and	ሾ2ሿ	and	renters	for	results	in	model	ሾ3ሿ.	The	null	hypothesis	of	
ߚீ ൌ ߚ௅	 is	 tested	 using	 one‐sided	 Wald	 tests	 against	 the	 alternative	 of	 ߚீ ൏ ߚ௅.	 The	 test	 statistics	 have	 a	 chi‐squared	
distribution	with	one	degree	of	freedom.	***,	**,	and	* indicate significance at	the	0.01,	0.05, and	0.10	levels,	respectively.
 
  
 
Source:	Japan	Real	Estate	Institute	 	
Fig.	1:	Repeat‐sales	price	index	for	the	Tokyo	metropolitan	area	
	 	
 
Source:	Keio	Household	Panel	Survey	
Fig.	2:	Average	self‐reported	home	values	
